

# From distribution to interaction grid

**Fundamental questions on the role of and tariff design in distribution networks of  
100% renewable energy systems**

**A framework for evaluating grid tariff policy proposals?**

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# Background

As generation costs of renewables are falling and prosumers are on the rise, policy debates are changing:

- towards post-feed-in-tarif market designs
- towards flexibility incentives
- ... and towards **grid tariff reform**

# Agenda (with spoiler)

1. Ask two fundamental questions (in order to establish an analytical lens):
  - 1) What is the role of a grid (a), and what is part of it? (b)
  - 2) Who pays, and according to what principle?
2. Evaluate current *regulatory principles* through this lens
3. Evaluate current *grid reform proposals* through this lens
4. Conclude
  - 1) Grid reform cannot sensibly be discussed without a new understanding of the role of the grid (=interaction grid)
  - 2) Grid reforms cannot sensibly be designed independently of (flexibility) market reforms
5. Outlook: Who owns data?

# 1: Ask fundamental questions


- 1) What is the role of a grid (a), and what is part of it? (b)
- 2) Who pays, and according to what principle?

# 1. a): What is/was the role of a grid?

**Figure 2:** Ideal-type illustration of centrally organized electricity network following the waterfall principle: A consumer pays for all voltage levels from their connection point at low voltage (beige), medium voltage (red) and high voltage (grey)

*Source: Wikimedia Commons (2006, 2008) and own illustration*

Zentral organisiertes Stromsystem:  
Teilvermaschtes Übertragungsnetz mit  
hierarchischem Verteilnetz  
Beige = Strombezug bei  
Niederspannungsanschluss  
Rot = Strombezug bei Mittelspannungsanschluss  
Grau = Strombezug bei  
Hochspannungsanschluss



# Tomorrow:

**Figure 3:** Decentrally organized electricity grid based on ‚subsidiarity principle‘.

Teilvermaschtes Übertragungsnetz mit teilvermaschtem Verteilnetz


Beige = Strombezug über alle Netzebenen bei Niederspannungsanschluss

Rot = Strombezug bei Mittelspannungsanschluss

Grau = Strombezug bei Hochspannungsanschluss

Grün = Strombezug innerhalb des Niederspannungsnetzes

Gelb = Strombezug innerhalb des Nieder- und Mittelspannungsnetzes



# Partial conclusion 1.a.)

- The role of the grid is to facilitate the transition to a renewables-based smart energy system

# 1. b.): What is part of the grid?


- If the grid and its operation is defined as a natural monopoly, then, by definition, only natural monopoly activities are part of the grid

## Partial conclusion 1.b)

- Both today and tomorrow: Natural monopoly




## 2. Who pays, how much and according to what principles? Illustration of EU consumer electricity prices:



**Figure 2 — Household electricity prices in 2017 (most representative consumption band) — Source: DG ENER in-house data collection<sup>3</sup>**

# Illustration of EU industry electricity prices:



**Figure 3 — Industrial electricity prices in 2017 — Source: DG ENER in-house data collection**

# Break-down of current Danish consumer prices

**Figure 1:** Composition of household electricity price in Denmark, July 2019.  
 Sources: 50 Hertz Transmission u. a. 2019; Dansk Energi 2018; Ørsted.dk 2019; Vattenfall Europe 2019; own calculations

Electricity price components households, July 2019	DK: Radius & Ørsted	
	DKK	EUR
Wholesale electricity	33,45 øre/kWh	4,49 cent/kWh
PSO-levy	0,0 øre/ kWh	0 cent/kWh
Subscription	31,2 DKK/ Month	4,19EUR/Month
Sum electricity charges excl. VAT	4,49 cent/kWh + 4,19 EUR/Month	
Grid subscription	25 DKK/Month	3,36EUR/Month
Local grid charge	30,01 øre/kWh	4,03 cent/kWh
	From 2020: 3,48 /8,97 cent/kWh	
Regional Grid charge	(not applicable in Radius grid)	
Transmission charge	4,4 øre / kWh	0,59 cent/kWh
System charge	3,6 øre / kWh	0,48 cent/kWh
Balancing charge	0,13 øre / kWh	0,017 cent/kWh
Regulation authority charge	0,13 øre / kWh	0,017 cent/kWh
Sum of grid charges excl. VAT	5,13 cent/kWh + 3,36 EUR/Month	
Electricity tax	91,00 øre/kWh	12,2 cent/kWh
Value-added tax	25 %	5,46 cent/kWh + 1,89 EUR/Month
Sum Taxes +VAT	17,66 cent/kWh + 1,89 EUR/Month	
Total	27,28 cent/kWh + 9,44 EUR/Month	

# A small dictionary of grid principles (*not* literal translations)

ENG	DK	DE	Definition
<b>„cost orientation principle“</b>	Omkostningsægthed	Verursacherprinzip	Currently by definition mostly a consumer, not a producer
<b>„Waterfall principle“</b>	vandfaldsprincip	<i>Kostenwälzungsprinzip</i>	The highest voltage level is the assumed level of generation.
<b>„Stamp principle“</b>		„Eine Briefmarke für ganz Europa“	Grid use costs the same no matter where electricity comes from
<b>Revenue cap regulation</b>	Indtægtsramme-regulering	Anreizregulierung	Today, allows for supernormal profits
Frequently used terms without exact equivalents across languages:			
<b>Not-for-profit ownership</b>	hvile-i-sig-selv, forbrugereje	Daseinsvorsorge Rekommunalisierung	These are terms used when not-for-profit ownership is being practiced or considered

## Evaluation current grid tariff principles

	Question 2: Who pays for grids, how much, and according to which principle?			
	(1) Waterfall principle	(2) Cost orientation principle	(2) Revenue cap regulation	(4) „Stamp principle“
1a: Does it facilitate a smart energy system?	No. The highest voltage level is the default level of origin by definition.	No. It seems that by definition, the „cause“ of costs can only be newcomers to the system, that is, new producers or new prosumers	No. Flexibilities cannot be bought, but only be built. This leads to a “copper only” strategy,	No, because local production is not „rewarded“ / lower transportation costs of combined local production and consumption is not reflected. Combination of this principle with the (1) discriminates producers at distribution level
1b: Is it a natural monopoly activity?	Yes, but it leads to over-investment in transmission capacity and underinvestment at distribution level	Yes, but it is inherently conservative because of the built-in path dependence	Yes, but the revenue cap regulation allows for supernormal profits	Yes, but it can be considered as a form of consumer subsidy for remote production that leads to expansion of the natural monopoly.

# Evaluate exemplary policy proposals

Question 2: Who pays for grids, how much, and according to which principle? Examples of policy proposals				
	Time (grid status) differentiated grid tariffs	distance differentiation (e.g. s from your neighbor than from offshore)	Capacity vs. Energy (usually: Increasing the capacity price component compared to todays kWh-based charge	Differentiation according to security of supply (remote control of supply, „netprodukt“) )
<b>1a: Does it facilitate a smart energy system?</b>	They can, but do not necessarily. What if grids are clogged with coal power?	Yes (it is a revision of the waterfall principle)	Only in combination with a flexibility market. Also, flat rate has the social downside (DK: „vender den tunge ende nedad“)	Yes, if the control parameters are set to maximise renewables uptake in the grid
<b>1b: Is it a natural monopoly activity?</b>	No. Could be provided via flexibility market	Yes. Paying less for grid use for electricity from your neighbor is a natural monopoly activity	Yes.	No. Could be provided via a flexibility market

local flexibility markets are an alternative to grid tariff reform

# 4. Conclusions

- **Re-interpreting the cost-orientation principle** as a principle of lowest system costs, reflecting a smart energy system thinking
- **Replacing the waterfall (and stamp) principles** by a **subsidiarity principle**
- **Unbundling monopoly and market domains at last** by **establishing local flexibility markets**
- **Redesigning the revenue cap regulation** (indtægtrammeregulering) can make the network operator a buyer of flexibilities, serving both as an incentive to the non-discriminatory and neutral role of the network monopoly and to make consumers more flexible through aggregators, thereby creating the basis for local flexibility markets
- **Departing from the copper plate assumption** in electricity market design by implementing „electricity regions“
- **Incentivizing PPA's (power purchase agreements)** for a a post feed-in era

**...can lead to successful energy policy reforms on the path to 100 % renewable smart energy systems**

# 5. Outlook: More on power and ownership

More on grid ownership:

→ Hvelplund, Frede, and Søren Djørup. 2019. “Consumer Ownership, Natural Monopolies and Transition to 100% Renewable Energy Systems.” *Energy* 181: 440–49.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2019.05.058>.

More on data ownership:

Intelligent meters do not only shift loads, but also power structures in energy systems

→ Hasberg, Kirsten Sophie. 2019. From Energopower to Infopower: Smart Energy Systems as Co-Constituted by Energy & Information Systems.

The introduction of hourly consumer electricity prices and time-varying network charges in Denmark (flexafregning) through the mandatory installation of smart meters gives distribution system operators data sovereignty over consumer data, which extends their monopoly position beyond the natural monopoly of the physical grid.



# Please help me find...

- Incoherent arguments
- Unclear points
- Logical fallacies

# Thank you!

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